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Do rankings reflect research quality?
Abstract
Publication and citation rankings have become major indicators of the scientific worth of universities
and determine to a large extent the career of individual scholars. Such rankings do not effectively
measure research quality, which should be the essence of any evaluation. These quantity rankings are
not objective; two citation rankings, based on different samples, produce entirely different results. For
that reason, an alternative ranking is developed as a quality indicator, based on membership on
academic editorial boards of professional journals. It turns out that the ranking of individual scholars
based on that measure is far from objective. Furthermore, the results differ markedly, depending on
whether research quantity or quality is considered. Thus, career decisions based on rankings are
dominated by chance and do not reflect research quality. We suggest that evaluations should rely on
multiple criteria. Public management should return to approved methods such as engaging independent
experts who in turn provide measurements of research quality for their research communities.
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Publication and citation rankings have become major indicators of the scientific worth of universities and determine to a large 
extent the career of individual scholars. Such rankings do not effectively measure research quality, which should be the essence 
of any evaluation. These quantity rankings are not objective; two citation rankings, based on different samples, produce entirely 
different results. For that reason, an alternative ranking is developed as a quality indicator, based on membership on academic 
editorial boards of professional journals. It turns out that the ranking of individual scholars based on that measure is far from 
objective. Furthermore, the results differ markedly, depending on whether research quantity or quality is considered. Thus, career 
decisions based on rankings are dominated by chance and do not reflect research quality. We suggest that evaluations should rely 
on multiple criteria. Public management should return to approved methods such as engaging independent experts who in turn 
provide measurements of research quality for their research communities. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The past decades have witnessed major advances in the methodology and practice of evaluation and policy research 
supported by the government as well as by private foundations (Metcalf 2008; Reingold 2008). Today, these 
evaluations mostly use quantitative techniques in order to test the effectiveness of ongoing programs. These 
techniques are also applied to the evaluation of scientific research. Citation and publication analysis—the analysis of 
data derived from scholarly publications and the references cited in scholarly publications—is a particularly popular 
method of examining and mapping the intellectual impact of scientists, projects, journals, disciplines, faculties, 
universities, and nations (Borgman 1990; Cronin and Meho 2008; Garfield 1979; Meho 2007; Moed 2005). This 
method has been used increasingly by academic, research, and public institutions worldwide for policymaking, to 
monitor scientific developments, and as a basis for promotions, tenure, hiring, salary, and grant decisions (Borgman 
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and Furner 2002; Warner 2000; Weingart 2005). Several governments have been using or are considering using 
citation analysis and other bibliometric measures to make decisions regarding research quality assessment and the 
allocation of research funds in higher education (Adam 2002; Butler 2007; Moed 2008; Weingart 2005). The most 
popular rankings are those that use publications and citations as indicators of scientific worth (e.g. Groot and Garcia-
Valderrama 2006; Moed et al. 1985; Nederhof and van Raan 1993; Tijssen and van Wijk 1999; Ventura and 
Mombru 2006). 
Such rankings are quantitative; they indicate the position or rather the significance of a scholar, university, or 
country relative to others. On the other hand, quality should be considered the essence of scientific research (e.g. 
Johnes 1988): From the perspective of society, it should not matter how many publications have been authored or 
how many citations have been accumulated, but rather what new insights have been produced and how valuable 
these are; that is, whether the research is useful, satisfies stated or implied needs, is free of deficiencies, and meets 
more general, social requirements (see e.g. Nightingale and Scott 2007; Reedijk 1998). An effort has been made to 
include quality aspects in rankings. Most importantly, only those publications and citations are counted that appear 
in scientific journals of “acceptable” quality, and publications in books or for policy purposes are excluded even 
though they may well contain important scientific information (as an exception e.g.  Sivertsen 2006). A further step 
is to consider “impact” factors that take into account how highly ranked a journal is in which a publication or 
citation appears. Nevertheless, the resulting rankings take the quality aspects of research activity into account to a 
limited extent only. For simplicity, in the following discussion, a ranking based on publications and citations is 
considered a quantitative ranking. It is compared to what we call a qualitative ranking, which is based on 
membership on the scientific boards of academic journals that consider the reputation and recognition of scholars 
among their peers. Scholarly reputation depends on a great many factors, but the qualitative aspect is certainly 
central.
1
 
This paper argues that the current bibliometric rankings, which are based on publications and citations, should be 
looked at more carefully than is the rule today. Publication and citation rankings have become a major, and 
sometimes even the only, indicator of the scientific worth of universities and countries and determine to a large 
                                                
1 Quantitative and qualitative rankings are not strictly separable as both contain elements of the other. The distinction is solely made for reasons 
of simplicity. 
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3 
extent the career of individual scholars.
2
 Whether an individual gets a position as an assistant professor at a 
university, receives tenure and is promoted to full professor, or receives research funding depends to a large extent 
on that individual’s publication and citation record, as published in the various rankings.
3
 We show that the various 
rankings produce quite different results depending on what underlying data are used and, in particular, what proxy is 
used to capture aspects of scientific quality. For that reason, an alternative ranking method is developed as a quality 
indicator, which is based on membership on academic editorial boards of professional journals. This ranking method 
constitutes a good approximation of the appreciation, hence the quality, attributed by professional peers. 
A significant result of our empirical study is that the ranking of individual scholars is far from consistent. The 
decisive factor is the kind of indicator used. The results differ markedly depending on whether publications, 
citations, or membership on scientific boards of professional journals are considered. Due to the high level of 
aggregation, the ranking of countries and institutions is less affected than the ranking of individual scholars. It 
follows that, if career decisions are made based on one particular ranking, the result is haphazard and does not 
correspond to the high standards of decision making desirable for determining academic careers. Our study adds to 
the existing literature as follows. 
First, in line with previous research, our study shows how much the positions of individuals, universities, or 
countries depend on exactly how the rankings are executed (Coupé 2003; Meho and Rogers 2008). However, in 
contrast to prior research, we not only compare different bibliometric indicators, but we also compare standard 
bibliometric indicators to esteem indicators, in particular, membership on editorial boards. Esteem indicators of 
research quality are based on the standing of an individual within the academic community, not on the number of 
published research outputs or the number of citations credited to this individual’s work. While these types of 
indicators are assumed to be important for areas where bibliometric indicators are difficult to apply, for example, the 
social sciences, their properties have only rarely been tested (Donovan and Butler 2007) and contrasted with 
standard bibliometric indicators. 
                                                
2 Examples of prominent rankings are ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Report (The Thomson Corporation 2008b); ISI Web of Knowledge 
Essential Science Indicators (The Thomson Corporation 2008a); IDEAS Ranking (IDEAS and RePEc 2008); Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (Shanghai Jiao Tong University 2007); or Handelsblatt Ranking (Handelsblatt 2007). 
3 A prominent and well-documented case is that of the Research Assessment Exercise in the United Kingdom, which uses the list of journals 
identified by Diamond (1989) (see Lee 2007). 
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Second, prior research on the comparison of different rankings either uses correlation coefficients or the list of 
top performers in order to show the overlap between rankings. However, correlations are insufficient to successfully 
compare the message of rankings because they pay the most attention to the mean of performers and less attention to 
the highest and lowest performers. In contrast, lists of top performers pay little attention to average or low 
performers. Our ranking shows the entire overlap between different rankings by using simple scatter plots. 
Third, in contrast to many papers on rankings, our paper is not a plea for more, new, or better rankings. We do 
not argue that the rankings based on editorial board membership are a new or better ranking method. Instead, we 
suggest that the promotion of social scientists should rely on different criteria that capture the various aspects of 
research quality. We do not think that one superior, objective ranking can possibly capture all the necessary criteria. 
We argue that public management, especially university management, should stop the mass euphoria of rankings 
and return to approved methods, such as engaging independent experts who in turn provide measurements of 
research quality that is applicable to their specific research community. 
Section II gives an overview of the ranking method currently in use, which is based on publications and citations, 
and identifies its shortcomings. How and to what extent quality is captured by an alternative definition of scientific 
worth, namely membership on editorial boards, is discussed in Section III. Section IV presents rankings based on 
editorial board membership for a sample of 115 economics journals. We chose economics journals because rankings 
are heavily used within that research community; the results, however, should be applicable also to other social 
sciences. The corresponding rankings are compared to the current rankings in Section V, and it is shown that they 
deviate in important respects. The last section argues that, due to the substantial instability of scientific rankings, 
significantly more care should be taken when using rankings for decision making, in particular, with respect to the 
careers of individual scholars. 
 
II. Current scientific rankings 
 
Do Rankings Reflect Research Quality? (mit Katja Rost) 
Journal of Applied Economics XIII(1) (Mai 2010): 1-38 
 
 
5 
Evaluating scientific quality is notoriously difficult. “One such difficulty is that the production of research typically 
involves multiple inputs and multiple outputs, which makes the use of standard parametric/regression techniques 
problematic. Another, more serious problem is that only minimal ‘engineering’ knowledge is usually available on 
the precise interrelationship between the research inputs that are used and the research outputs that are produced” 
(Cherchye and Abeele 2005: 496). Ideally, established experts in the field should scrutinize published scientific 
results. In practice, however, committees with general competence, rather than specialists, often evaluate primary 
research data. In the past, these committees used peer review and other expert-based judgments until claims were 
made that expert judgments could be biased and, therefore, inferior to seemingly objective measures, such as the 
number of publications and citations (Horrobin 1990; Moxham and Anderson 1992). The opinions of experts may 
indeed be influenced by subjective elements, narrow mindedness, and limited cognitive horizons. These 
shortcomings may result in conflicts of interest, unawareness of quality, or a negative bias against young scientists 
or newcomers to a particular field. Today, these committees tend to employ secondary criteria,
4
 and it is hardly 
surprising that the dominant ranking principle for evaluating research focuses on quantity, which appears to be an 
objective indicator that is directly related to published science.
5
 Such bibliometric indicators have a number of 
advantages. First, the data are easily available, for example, from publication lists or other data sources like the Web 
of Science. Second, bibliometric counts seem to be objective indicators. Third, the comparison between the large 
number of candidates or institutions is facilitated. When the number of publications and the number of citations are 
collected, an effort is also made to take the importance or the quality of what is published into account.
6
  
The publication measures normally categorize according to the scientific publications in which papers have 
appeared. Thus, for example, most rankings ignore publications such as books, general public notices, handbooks, 
and other collections of articles, as well as anything published in a non-refereed journal (Donovan and Butler 2007; 
Johnes 1988; Reedijk 1998). Publications in refereed journals are categorized according to the prominence of the 
journal, which is measured by impact factors (see, e.g., the extensive set of corresponding measures used by IDEAS 
in RePEc). However, these rankings do not reflect the research quality of an individual or an institution. For 
                                                
4 Rigby and Edler (2005) analyzed to what degree the bibliometric information of 169 research groups in economics, econometrics, and business 
administration relates to the assessment results of three evaluation committees. More than half of the variance of the overall quality judgments of 
the committees can be predicted by using a handful of bibliometric variables, notably the number of publications in top class and international 
refereed journals, the number of international proceedings, and the number of Dutch journal articles. 
5 An excellent overview of the problems and pitfalls of using citation statistics is given in Adler, Ewing, and Taylor (2008). 
6 Many journal rankings according to citations have been undertaken, (e.g., Cheng, Holsapple, and Lee 1995; Diamond 1989; Laband and Piette 
1994; Liebowitz and Palmer 1984; Podsakoff et al. 2005). 
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example, they neglect the fact that, even in journals with a high impact factor, many papers never get cited.
7
 Seglen 
(1994) points out that only a weak correlation exists between the impact factor of a journal and the individual papers 
in that journal (mean r = 0.32; range 0.05–0.66). He shows that 15 percent of the articles account for 50 percent of 
the impact factor of a journal. Further, based on a sample of 56 research programs, Rinia et al. (1998) demonstrate 
that the impact of journals in which scholars of research program published does not correlate with the quality of 
these programs as perceived by peers. Thus, the impact of articles is not detectably influenced by the impact of the 
journal in which the articles are published because the citation rates of an article determine the impact factor of a 
journal, but not the reverse (Seglen 1997). The attempt to capture a qualitative aspect in the current rankings 
depends on citations. Citations in more prominent journals (where prominence is again measured in terms of 
citations) receive a higher weight in the rankings than those in lesser journals. Thus, the procedure is recursive. This 
whole process originally started with journal analyses, but nowadays has been extended to include countries, 
universities, institutes, and even individual researchers. In a sense, the academic world has gradually become 
obsessed with impact factors. Citation records are considered a proxy for the ability to do quality research, not only 
by authors, librarians, and journal publishers, but also by science policy makers (e.g. Nederhof and van Raan 1993). 
According to this view, citations represent evidence that the individual, the journal, the institute, or the country cited 
has carried out work that is viewed as relevant to the current research frontier and is useful to those attempting to 
extend the frontier (Diamond 1986). However, to the extent that citations inadequately account for scientific quality, 
the corresponding rankings distort the informative function they claim to provide. 
There are six major shortcomings for using citations as indicators of scientific quality. First, they do not take into 
account whether a scholar’s contribution is positive and furthers the course of scientific knowledge, it is neutral, or it 
hinders scientific progress.
8
 The latter happens if it promotes an unproductive or even wrong approach, theory, 
method, or result, which either serves as a research basis for other scholars or is used by the public for policy 
purposes or guidance. If qualitative aspects were taken seriously, unproductive citations would be given a zero 
rating and counterproductive citations a negative weight. This is a very difficult pursuit, but nevertheless we should 
not allow it to divert us from the fundamental task of trying to measure the scientific activity of seeking “truth” 
(irrespective of how it is defined). 
                                                
7  Although the distribution of papers’ quality in a journal is skewed it is risky to assume an article quality as the journal average (Vieira 2004). 
8 This is why bibliometricians use the term “impact.” 
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There is a second important reason why counting the number of citations may lead to distortions. Scholars are 
human beings subject to the same influences as other people. Following fashionable trends or herding behavior are 
examples of such influences (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992) where scholars quote 
papers simply because they have previously been cited by other researchers. Citing a particular paper does not 
necessarily reveal its relevance for the development of science, but may only say something about its academic 
popularity. Empirical research is consistent with this conclusion. Simkin and Roychowdhury (2005; 2006; 2007) 
show that the probability of a scholar being cited is affected by the number of citations he or she already has. This 
has been called the “Matthew Effect” in science (Merton 1968). Insiders are well aware of this tendency, especially 
in modern academia where academics are forced to publish or risk ending their careers. Receiving a high number of 
citations does not necessarily imply scientific genius, but is consistent with the result of a random process. This 
leads to the emergence of “star” papers and authors (Barabási and Albert 1999; Bonitz, Bruckner, and Scharnhorst 
1999). These stars are like social celebrities whose only claim to fame is that they are famous, but few know or care 
about how they reached stardom. In the case of celebrities, this is of little relevance as their main objective is to 
entertain. However, in the case of science where a commitment to the search for truth is so important, such citations 
should be put into a different category; they should not count as positive contributions. 
Third, the fact that a particular work has been cited does not mean that it has been read (Donovan 2006). While 
no scholar would be foolish enough to publicly admit that he or she cited articles without having read them, there is 
now empirical evidence that this does occur to a significant extent. One indicator of that practice is when identical 
misprints turn up repeatedly in citations, suggesting that the respective authors did not read the text cited, but simply 
copied someone else’s work. Such misprints are most likely to occur when authors copy reference lists contained in 
other’s papers. On the basis of a careful statistical analysis, Simkin and Roychowdhury (2005) conclude that about 
70–90 percent of scientific citations are copied from the lists of references used in other papers; that is, 70–90 
percent of the cited papers have not been read by those citing them. 
Fourth, citation counts do not indicate quality that is independent of the contested knowledge (Beed and Beed 
1996). In contested disciplines, such as economics, management, or other social sciences, differential citation counts 
indicate which author, article, or journal embraces the dominant theory most completely and which does not (Lee 
2006). Articles embracing unfamiliar knowledge are assumed to have unimportant content and, therefore, are not 
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cited. Thus, differences in citation rankings often reflect the subjective or ideological rejection of the theory 
employed rather than the research quality or the importance of the research to the discipline. Consequently, in 
departments or universities where tenure, promotions, salaries, and department funding are affected by citation 
rankings, contested findings, which are mostly published in less prestigious journals, are penalized (Bräuninger and 
Haucap 2003; Coats 1971; Lee 2006). Evaluations relying on citation counts therefore crowd out the crucially 
important innovative research in the social sciences. 
Fifth, it is widely accepted as a best practice in the bibliometric community not to apply publication and citation 
measures to individuals, but to higher levels of aggregation, in particular, to universities or countries (van Raan 
2003). Bibliometric scientists further argue that although these indicators may make sense in the natural and life 
sciences such indicators prove problematic in the social and behavioral sciences where journals play a lesser role as 
primary communication channels, many research fields are locally oriented, and older literature is more dominant 
(van Raan 2003). In fact, these restrictions are often disregarded. For example, Dutch economists have been ranked 
by means of bibliometric indicators (De Ruyter van Steveninck 1998). Similarly, Belgian economists (Bauwens 
1998) and German economists have also been ranked (Bommer and Ursprung 1998) using bibliometric indicators. 
Coupé (2003) even provides a worldwide ranking of economists by means of bibliometric indicators.
9
 The benefit of 
such proceedings is doubtful and may negatively affect the quality of the social sciences. 
Sixth, in the long run, counts of citations promote strategic behavior, as is the case for most ex-ante 
measurements (Butler 2003). Scholars thus are induced to focus predominantly on publishing articles in the most 
prominent journals that embrace the dominant theories because this strategy promises abundant citations 
(Holmström and Milgrom 1991). Academic activities that are not counted are ignored, such as research that uses 
unorthodox approaches as well as the supervision of students, teaching, or contacts with the public (Frey 2003; Frey 
and Osterloh 2006). 
                                                
9 These rankings are not only made for reasons of prestige or for fun, but are also are used for promotion and funding decisions. For example, in 
Germany in 2006, a newspaper emerged as the key provider of academic rankings. Each year this newspaper ranks individual economists 
according to the number of their publications in peer-reviewed journals (Handelsblatt 2007). Only publications in scientific journals of 
“acceptable” quality are counted and weighted according to their impact. The journalists of that newspaper composed the list and decided which 
journals were included. This ranking has now been extended to other social sciences, for example, to management studies. The Handelsblatt 
ranking has served to distinguish “excellent” from “incompetent” researchers; it also serves as an aid when making decisions regarding the 
promotion of scholars in universities and research institutions and when determining how to distribute government funds for research and 
teaching. 
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The list of shortcomings could easily be extended further to include the different citation habits of authors in 
different fields and subfields, the selectivity of citations by authors (e.g., easily available papers are cited more 
often), unintended spelling errors by authors in citation lists, mistakes in counting and classifying citations and 
accrediting them to journals and authors, and the inclusion of self citations (especially by determining the journal 
impact factor).
10
 Due to these shortcomings in using citations as reliable indicators of scientific quality,
11
 there is 
good reason to think about alternative approaches. The next section discusses the possibility of taking quality into 
account by considering the reputation of scholars among their peers, which is approximated by counting 
membership on scientific editorial boards. 
 
III. Ranking based on membership on editorial boards 
 
A. Qualitative rankings 
 
Scientific knowledge is not some immutable objective stock that grows quantitatively; rather, it is fallible, 
historically contingent, contestable, and changes unpredictably and qualitatively. This is especially true for the social 
sciences. What constitutes scientific knowledge depends on the approval by the scientific community (Lee 2006). A 
defining characteristic of any science is that its participants consider themselves members of a community of 
scholars. When producing scientific knowledge, they depend to some degree on each other. Scientists who do not fit 
into this structure of dependency or do not produce the “right” kind of knowledge are not permitted to be part of the 
community. For this reason, embeddedness in a research community is a quality indicator of research. It ensures that 
the scientists and their research meet community-based acceptable research standards, for example, utilizing 
acceptable research techniques. 
                                                
10 Some editors freely admit that they induce authors to cite as many publications in their journal as possible in order to raise their impact factor 
(Garfield 1997). 
11 Moed et al. (1985) argue that citation counts indicate “impact” rather than quality. Impact is defined as actual influence on surrounding 
research activities. Even though publications must have a certain basic quality in order to generate impact, other factors determine impact as well, 
like the state-of-the-art of the scientific field concerned, the visibility of journals, or the extent to which researchers carry out public relations 
tasks. Further, Moed et al. (1985) make a distinction between short- and long-term impacts. A short-term impact refers to the impact of 
researchers at the research front up to a few years after publication of their research results. A long-term impact refers to the “durability” of 
research and can only be determined after a (very) long time. However, this period is often too long for science policy, which is concerned with 
evaluation of recent research. 
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Professional scientific journals are the publication outlets of different research communities. The editorial boards 
of these journals play a considerable role, both in the dissemination of information and in its evaluation by 
colleagues. “It appears reasonable that these positions are held by people who have the confidence and trust of their 
colleagues in the journal’s areas of coverage for the journal to be successful in attracting quality submissions.” 
(Kaufman 1984: 1190). In this respect, the editorial board constitutes the true experts in the research community, 
and being appointed an editorial board member is not only a great honor, but can also be seen as one indicator of 
scientific quality. 
The board fulfils two different functions: (1) it assists the editors in choosing the most suitable articles for the 
respective scientific field, and (2) membership on the board is purely honorific and reflects one’s standing in the 
profession as evaluated by one’s peers. Honorary members are often chosen to signal the orientation of the review 
(e.g., the specific discipline or whether its emphasis is on theoretical or empirical work). More importantly, journals 
want to profit from the reputation of honorary board members (Kaufman 1984). The more distinguished these 
members are within their discipline and community, the higher the journal’s reputation because renowned scholars 
do not join the boards of poor quality journals (and were they to do so, their own reputation and the journal’s 
reputation would decline). Both when board members contribute to editorial decisions and when they are mainly, or 
only, honorary members, the choice of members is based on quality. A (chief) editor wants to have scholars at hand 
who help him or her make the best possible decisions, and disreputable persons or persons lacking expert knowledge 
are useless. At the same time, those scholars represented on boards have a high professional reputation; therefore, 
membership on boards can be taken to be a reasonable approximation of the quality of a scholar as judged by his or 
her peers.
12
 Gibbons and Fish (1991: 364) take it as a matter of course: “Certainly, the more editorial boards an 
economist is on, the more prestigious the economist.” 
It should be noted that using the number of editorial board positions as a quality indicator also has some 
disadvantages. First, the use of editorial boards clearly favors established scholars. However, using the number of 
publications and citations has the same disadvantage. This limitation should therefore not bias our results when 
comparing quantitative and qualitative rankings. Second, board membership is also influenced by the need for 
appropriate representation. This holds true in particular for “home” journals, which are closely related to a specific 
                                                
12 This procedure has been put forward in the past and undertaken for small and distinct sets of journals by Kaufman (1984) for finance faculties, 
Kurtz and Boone (1988) for marketing faculties, and Gibbons (1990) for statistics faculties. 
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department or university (such as the Oxford Economic Papers to Oxford University or the Journal of Political 
Economy to the University of Chicago) and for journals owned by professional associations, which have to ensure 
that they reflect, at least to some extent, their members’ diversity with respect to gender, fields of interest, schools of 
thinking, and regions and nationalities. Proponents of quantitative rankings might argue that the need for appropriate 
representation is not solely guided by considerations of quality, and this fact could explain the small overlap 
between quantitative and qualitative rankings. For that reason, home and association journals are not considered in 
what follows.
13
 Third, one could argue that only a small fraction of all scholars are members of editorial boards. 
This fact distorts the results because it includes only the best scientists. However, economists in many countries 
have their own journals. Within these journals, the countrywide experts within a field are members of editorial 
boards. While our research mainly relies on worldwide recognized scholars, research evaluation could also include 
country journals. 
 
B. Sample 
 
 
In order to analyze the extent of instability among the various rankings of scholars, institutions, and countries, we 
selected a sample of journals, which are considered to have an excellent reputation within the field of economics. 
This sample is representative of dominant theories within economics. In order to show that quantitative rankings do 
not reflect research quality, these sample restrictions are less important. We expect similar effects in other sciences 
as well as in lower-ranked journals. However, it should be noted that our sample does not provide a comprehensive 
overview of all research communities within economics. In particular, heterodox research communities embracing 
contested knowledge are excluded (Lee 2008). We used the lists of two well-known journal rankings, the ISI Web of 
Knowledge Journal Citation Report (The Thomson Corporation 2008b) and the Handelsblatt Ranking (Handelsblatt 
2007). The ISI Journal Citation Report is often considered to be an objective ranking because it is based on citations. 
From 175 journals listed in the subject category economics, we selected all journals with an impact factor ? 0.9, that 
is, 67 journals (excluding 10 home and association journals). The Handelsblatt Ranking, a very popular ranking in 
German speaking countries that is often influential in career decisions, can be viewed as more subjective because it 
is not only based on citations, but also on general impressions of scientists doing economic research. The 
                                                
13 We define a home journal as a journal whose editorial board is affiliated with the same institution. 
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Handelsblatt Rankings does not have a German language bias; it exclusively ranks international journals. From the 
220 economics journals, we selected all journals ranked as AA+, A+, A, B+, and B, that is, 95 journals (excluding 
17 home and association journals). As both rankings overlap to a large extent, our final sample covers 115 journals, 
excluding 19 home and association journals (the sample is listed in Appendix A).
14
 Our sample largely overlaps with 
the other rankings of prominent economic journals. For this reason, we did not include a third or fourth ranking. 
We consulted the homepage of each journal and collected the names of 4,855 persons who serve as editors, 
coeditors, or board members.
15
 In order to identify multiple board memberships, the data were checked by 
consulting each person’s personal website. Any misspellings of the names, institutions, or countries were corrected, 
and first names and current institutions of employment were added. The final sample covers 3,783 different persons; 
546 persons (14 percent) serve as board members or editors of more than one journal.
16
 As with previous editorial 
rankings, 55 percent of these people are affiliated with U.S.-based academic institutions (Hodgson and Rothman 
1999). 
Following Gibbons and Fish (1991), the absolute number of memberships on editorial boards was calculated (? 
Board Membership). As the board size varies from three to 232 members (e.g., Management Science), we also 
report a relative measure of membership by counting weighted board positions. Smaller boards might reflect smaller 
research communities. Community size is a quantitative, but not necessarily a qualitative measurement. The weight 
of a position within a particular journal is calculated by dividing the position by the absolute number of similar 
positions offered within the same journal (? Significance). 
 
C. Definition of board membership 
 
 
                                                
14 Other studies use a much smaller number of journals. For instance, Stigler, Stigler, and Friedland (1995) examine nine leading core journals in 
economics. In a recent study, Hodgson and Rothman (1999: 165 f.) take “the 30 most visible and well-known economics journals” into 
consideration. In the subject category Economics, the ISI Web of Knowledge considers about the same number of journals as we do, that is, 191 
journals in 2008. Other sources list a larger number. For instance, the Judge Institute of Management Studies (1994) compiled a list of 1,431 
management and social science journals, of which 231 have words based on “econ” (such as economy, economics, or econometrics) in their title. 
15 This compares to 757 persons in (Hodgson and Rothman 1999). 
16 The sample, including home and association journals, covers 3,983 different individuals, 600 individuals (15 percent) serve as board members 
or editors of more than one journal. 
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Various definitions of “member of a scientific editorial board” are possible: (1) the broadest possible definition 
includes all positions, that is, editors, coeditors, and board members;
17
 (2) the broad definition includes only 
coeditors and board member positions; (3) the narrow definition includes only board member positions. We take two 
considerations into account with regard to the measurement of research quality that we favor, as discussed above, 
and use the broad definition in what follows.
18
 First, the broadest definition has the disadvantage that editor titles 
have different meanings in different journals. For example, with some journals, the editor is largely concerned with 
the practical management of the journal and less with its academic content. This meaning does not measure research 
quality. Second, the narrow definition may exclude too many individuals who play an active academic role in 
shaping the journal. Among the journals, there is a smooth transition between the descriptive categories coeditor and 
board member. For example, in some journals, the whole board consists of coeditors or advisory editors. 
As different definitions result in different rankings, we checked for the sensitivity of the results to different 
definitions of board membership (Appendix B, Table A2). It turns out that different definitions do not affect the 
rankings of scientists, institutions, or countries. 
 
IV. Ranking results for board membership 
 
A. Ranking of scholars 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the scholar ranking according to the number of boards on which they serve. The table 
shows all scholars who hold four or more board positions. We document the number of positions per scholar (? 
Board Membership) and the resulting quality ranking according to this number (Quality Ranking 1 with a maximum 
                                                
17 Among journals, the terms editors, coeditors, and board members can be understood in many ways. The lack of uniformity in the terms makes 
the identification of similar positions problematic. In order to distinguish between different types, we used the following terminology: (1) we 
defined the following as editors: Editor, Managing Editor, Book Review Editor, Contributing Editors, Foreign Editor, Chairman, Founding 
Editor, Production Editor, Review Editor, Conference Editor, Patron, Coordinating Editor, Debates and Controversies Editor, European Editor, 
Guest Editor, Publishing Editor, Replication Section Editor, Software Editor and Software Review Editor. Individuals who are not a part of the 
scientific community, that is, without publications, were excluded (e.g., managing editors from the publisher); (2) we defined the following as 
coeditors: Coeditor, Co-Chairman and Vice President; and (3) we defined the following as board members: Board Member, Advisory Editor, 
Executive Council, Panel Member, Scientific Committee, Honorary Editor, and Honorary Advisory Editor. 
18 The ranking of the broadest editor definition and of the narrow definition have a high correlation with the broad definition. 
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rank of 7), as well as the significance of these board positions per scholar (? Significance) and the resulting quality 
ranking according to the significance (Quality Ranking 2 with a maximum rank of 382). The two measures are then 
combined in order to reach a more definite ranking. The combined quality rankings per scholar (Combined Quality 
Ranking with a maximum rank of 389) is derived by using the absolute number of board positions as a first sorting 
criterion (? Board Membership) and then the weighted significance of these positions as a second sorting criterion 
(? Significance). Scholars with equal scores in both criteria, that is, ? Board Membership and ? Significance, 
receive the same ranking. 
The ranking of scholars in Table 1 shows three Nobel Prize winners among the first eleven scholars—Kenneth 
Arrow, Reinhard Selten, and Vernon Smith—but also some lesser-known individuals. The representation of Nobel 
Prize winners can be taken as an indication that board membership does indeed reflect quality aspects of research. 
On the other hand, the large number of lesser-known scholars gives a first hint that rankings based on the number of 
board positions are not necessarily related to quality. A ranking according to the absolute number of editorial board 
positions (Ranking 1) draws different quality conclusions than a ranking according to the sum of the relative weights 
of these positions (Ranking 2). 
Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 1.A gives a graphical overview of how the two quality rankings are related, contrasting the ranking of a 
scholar according to the absolute number of memberships on editorial boards (Quality Ranking 1) with the ranking 
of a scholar according to the significance of these positions (Quality Ranking 2). The graph reveals that a high 
number of board positions does not necessarily imply that these positions are of high significance. For example, the 
several scholars who ranked third according to the number of board positions (Quality Ranking 1) may be ranked 
very well (with a rank around 12) to quite poorly (with a rank around 98) according to the significance of these 
positions (Quality Ranking 2). Similarly, the several scholars who ranked sixth according to the number of board 
positions (Quality Ranking 1) may be ranked high (with a rank around 4) to quite low (with a rank around 379) 
according to the significance of these positions (Quality Ranking 2). Figure 1.A confirms that the ranking of 
individual scholars is highly dependent on the type of ranking used. 
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Figure 1 about here 
 
B. University ranking 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the university ranking. The table shows the top ranked 20 universities according to the 
number of board positions. We document the number of positions per university (? Board Membership) and the 
resulting quality ranking (Quality Ranking 1 with a maximum rank of 48), the weighted significance of these 
positions per university (? Significance), and the resulting quality ranking (Quality Ranking 2 with a maximum rank 
of 398). The combined quality ranking (Combined Quality Ranking with a maximum rank of 403) is specified by 
taking the number of positions held as a first sorting criterion (? Board Membership) and the significance of these 
positions as a second sorting criterion (? Significance). Table 2 further documents the number of board positions 
per faculty member (? Faculty Member) and the resulting quality ranking (Quality Ranking 3). Department size was 
measured as the number of economists within a faculty (Roessler 2004). 
It comes as no great surprise that Harvard University and Stanford University are at the top of the list when 
looking at the results according to the number of board positions (Quality Ranking 1), which is similar to previous 
rankings based on editorial boards (Gibbons and Fish 1991) or rankings based on quantity measures like 
publications or citations. A ranking according to the significance of board positions (Ranking 2) would change the 
former results to some degree with MIT and Harvard University at the top. Even more changes occur if the ranking 
is according to the number of board positions per faculty member. This ranking would result in the Federal Reserve 
Bank (not included in Table 2) and the University of Washington being at the top.  
 
Table 2 about here 
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Figure 1.B gives a graphical overview of the consistency of the ranking of a university according to the number 
of board positions (Quality Ranking 1) with the ranking of a university according to significance of these positions 
(Quality Ranking 2). The results in Figure 1.B indicate that a university ranking seems to be more reliable than the 
ranking of individual scholars. In most cases, a high number of board positions reflects the high significance of these 
positions. For example, the university that is ranked first according to the number of board positions (Quality 
Ranking 1) is ranked second according to the significance of these positions (Quality Ranking 2). Similarly, the 
several universities with rank 26 according to the number of board positions (Quality Ranking 1) are ranked from 26 
to 41 according to the significance of these positions (Quality Ranking 2). Thus, the results suggest that a university 
ranking is less dependent on the ranking type used than are the rankings of individual scholars. 
 
C. Country ranking 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the country ranking. The table documents the first 20 countries according to the 
number of board positions held by scholars active in the various countries. It shows the number of positions per 
country (? Board Membership) and the resulting quality ranking (Quality Ranking 1 with a maximum rank of 29), 
as well as the weighted significance of these positions per country (? Significance) and the resulting quality ranking 
(Quality Ranking 2 with a maximum rank of 37). The Combined Quality Ranking (with a maximum rank of 50) is 
constructed by using the absolute number of positions as a first sorting criterion (? Board Membership) and the 
significance of positions as a second sorting criterion (? Significance). Table 3 also shows the number of board 
positions per one million inhabitants (? per one million inhabitants) and the resulting quality ranking (Quality 
Ranking 3). 
The results of the country ranking using the various measures are quite similar. A ranking according to the 
number of positions (Quality Ranking 1) as well as a ranking according to significance of board positions (Quality 
Ranking 2) results in the U.S., the UK, and Canada being on top. A ranking based on the number of positions per 
one million inhabitants hardly changes the former results. The U.S. is still at the top, and the UK comes second. 
However, Israel and not Canada comes third. 
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Table 3 about here 
 
Figure 1.C contrasts the ranking of a country according to the number of board positions (Quality Ranking 1) 
with the ranking of a country according to the significance of board positions (Quality Ranking 2). Both rankings are 
highly correlated. A high number of board positions per country reflects the high significance of these positions. 
Thus, a ranking of countries is quite independent of which of the two measures is used. 
 
V. Comparison with rankings based on publications and citations 
 
This section compares the results of the board ranking with the results of previous rankings based on publications 
(IDEAS and RePEc 2008), citations (The Thomson Corporation 2008a), or on weighted quantity aspects (Shanghai 
Jiao Tong University 2007). For this comparison, we rely only on the Combined Quality Ranking, which uses the 
number of board positions as a first sorting criterion and, only if necessary, the significance of these positions, that 
is, the relative weight of a position to correct for community size, as a second sorting criterion. An underlying 
assumption is that the existence of a board position indicates the existence of a true expert in the field and research 
community. In the following, we therefore rely on absolute figures as proxies for scientific quality. Another 
possibility would be to rely on normalized figures to take care of additional aspects. However, the use of normalized 
figures often results in an indefinite number of rankings (see, e.g., the extensive set of normalized rankings used by 
IDEAS in RePEc). For this reason, we mainly rely on absolute figures, that is, the number of board positions as a 
first sorting criterion. 
 
A. Rankings of individual scholars 
 
 
At the scholar level, Figure 2.A contrasts the ranking of a scholar according to membership on editorial boards 
(Combined Quality Ranking) with the ranking of a scholar according to the ISI Citation Ranking (with a maximum 
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rank of 200), which includes the Top-200 economists according to the number of Web of Science citations (The 
Thomson Corporation 2008a). The Web of Science database considers all citations from articles published in 
refereed scholarly journals indexed in the Science Citation Index (SCI), the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), 
and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI) in addition to the citations made among these papers. 
However, the database only takes into account those journals that have been elected as a member of the Web of 
Science database. According to the results in Figure 2.A, ranking consistency is definitely not observed: First, no 
scholar is listed in the Top 10 of both types of rankings. Second, the majority of scholars identified through board 
memberships—even those scholars with higher rankings—are not mentioned in the ISI citation ranking. Third, it 
seems to be the general rule that scholars listed in the ISI ranking in the foremost rankings are listed last in a quality 
ranking or are not even listed in a quality ranking. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The ranking of a scholar according to membership on editorial boards (Combined Quality Ranking) can also be 
compared with the ranking according to the IDEAS Paper Ranking (with a maximum rank of 1000), which includes 
the Top-1,000 economists according to the number of journal articles, books, and published working papers (IDEAS 
and RePEc 2008). The IDEAS database considers 344,000 journal articles from leading economics journals, 2,700 
economics books, and 237,000 economics working papers. The database only takes journals, books, and working 
papers of members into account. Membership is voluntary, but has to be registered. According to our  results 
(available upon request), ranking consistency is again not observed. No scholar is listed in the Top 30 of both types 
of rankings. According to our data and analysis, it appears to be a general rule that individual scholars listed at the 
top of the IDEAS paper ranking are listed last in our quality ranking. This is consistent with the fact that most 
scholars are identified in one, but not in both rankings. 
The ranking of a scholar according to membership on editorial boards (Combined Quality Ranking) can be 
compared with the ranking according to the IDEAS Citation Ranking (with a maximum rank of 1000), which 
includes the Top-1,000 economists according to the number of citations (IDEAS and RePEc 2008). The IDEAS 
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database considers all citations from refereed journal articles, books, and working papers electronically published in 
the IDEAS database. As before, ranking consistency is definitely not observed for individual scholars. 
Appendix C looks at the relationship between the rankings of individual scholars based on quantitative measures, 
that is, the number of citations or publications counted, dependent on the database. As in previous cases, much of the 
ranking of individual scholars depends on exactly what measure is used. 
To summarize, our analysis suggests that board membership yields very different rankings of individual scholars 
than does a ranking based on the number of publications and citations. Basing the promotion of scholars and funding 
decisions for their work only on a quantitative measure in the form of the number of publications or citations 
therefore may not be warranted because it does not capture the multiple aspects involved. Membership on the 
editorial board of academic journals conveys some different information content, but much also depends on what 
specific measure is used (in our case Quality Ranking 1 or Quality Ranking 2). 
 
B. University rankings 
 
At the university level, Figure 2.B compares the ranking of a university according to membership on editorial boards 
(Combined Quality Ranking) with the ranking of a university according to the ISI Citation Ranking (with a 
maximum rank of 100), which includes the Top-100 economics and business universities according to the number of 
Web of Science citations (The Thomson Corporation 2008a). As with individual scholars, the Web of Science 
database considers all citations from articles published in refereed scholarly journals in the areas of science, social 
science, arts and humanities, and chemistry, however, only from selected journals. Figure 2.B shows that the results 
between quantity and quality rankings are more consistent for universities than for individual scholars. For example, 
a more detailed analysis shows that eight of the Top-10 universities listed in the board ranking are listed in the Top 
10 of the ISI ranking (no figure or table). However, as one can see in Figure 2.B, many universities listed favorably 
in the board ranking are not even mentioned in the ISI ranking. The overlap for the two types of rankings is small, 
especially for the middle rankings (compare Figure 2.B Combined Quality Rank 50–150 with the corresponding ISI 
Citation Rank). 
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The university ranking according to membership on editorial boards (Combined Quality Ranking) can be 
compared with the Shanghai Reputation Ranking (with a maximum rank of 100), which includes the Top-100 
universities according to weighted quantity aspects like publications, citations, Nobel Prize winners, and so on 
(Shanghai Jiao Tong University 2007).
19
 There is little consistency between the two rankings. Many universities 
listed high according to the board ranking are not mentioned in the Shanghai Ranking. Appendix C looks at the 
relationship between the quantity-based rankings of ISI and Shanghai. Again they hardly overlap because more than 
half of all institutions are only considered in one but not in both rankings. 
For universities, rankings on the basis of different measures come to quite different conclusions with respect to 
the specific research performance of a university. However, compared with the almost nonexistent overlap of the 
rankings for individual scholars, the rankings at the university level are considerably more consistent. This finding is 
in line with the results of Rinia et al. (1998). The authors show that different measures of research performance, that 
is, bibliometric measures and peer-review measures, generally show the strongest correlation on aggregate levels 
like on the team level. 
 
C. Rankings of countries 
 
 
Figure 2.C compares the ranking of a country according to membership on editorial boards (Combined Quality 
Ranking) with its ranking according to the ISI Citation Ranking (with a maximum rank of 81), which includes all 
countries according to the number of Web of Science citations (The Thomson Corporation 2008a). According to 
Figure 2.C, the results for quantity and quality rankings are quite consistent. Those countries included in both 
rankings are evaluated in a similar way. 
The ranking of a country according to membership on editorial boards (Combined Quality Ranking) can be 
compared with the ranking of a country according to the ISI Paper Ranking (with a maximum rank of 81), which 
                                                
19 Of course, one can doubt whether this comparison is meaningful because the Shanghai index is not specifically about economics and includes 
several dimensions that may have little to do with quality. However, the index is used for research evaluation and funding decisions. Therefore a 
comparison with different rankings is of interest.  
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includes all countries according to the number of published Web of Science publications. The results are close to 
those in Figure 2.C. 
Finally, the overlap of the two quantity rankings is nearly perfect. Thus, at the country level, different rankings 
come to quite similar conclusions with respect to the specific research performance of a country. 
VI. Conclusions 
We have argued that both citation and publication measures capture only some aspects of scientific quality. The 
empirical results indicate that the ranking of scholars based on membership on editorial boards does not correlate 
well with a ranking based on publications and citations. Especially for individual scholars, our study suggests that 
rankings based on quantity are incompatible with rankings based on membership on editorial boards, which suggests 
that both indices do not measure the same thing. Membership on editorial boards captures something else, 
something that is valuable to academic evaluation and that should not be disregarded. Editorial board membership 
should be taken as one additional and important aspect of research quality. Research needs both scholars who are 
productive in terms of publishing and scholars who are productive in terms of running journals. For that reason, 
research evaluation should consider multiple measurements rather than citation or publication counts only. 
This conclusion is in line with prior research. Henrekson and Waldenstrom (2007) rank all full professors in 
economics in Sweden using seven established measures of research performance. Their examination shows that the 
rank order can vary greatly across measures and that depending on the measure used the distribution of total 
research output is valued very differently. This finding is also validated by other authors (Coupé 2003; Donovan and 
Butler 2007; Lo, Wong, and Mixon 2008) suggesting that research quality can only be captured by multiple 
indicators. This result is in line with bibliometric research that warns against using publications and citations as the 
only measurement to capture the research effort of individuals, especially individuals in the social sciences (van 
Raan 2003). 
For the career decisions of individual scholars, bibliometric rankings should be used with utmost care. “Crude 
rankings … cannot be helpful to the policy maker” (Johnes 1988: 177). Funding agencies and other decision makers 
desiring to evaluate the research efforts of individual researchers or of the whole university sector should go beyond 
applying standard quantitative measures of research performance to the social sciences (Council for the Humanities 
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Arts and Social Sciences 2005; Katz 1999; Luwel et al. 1999). Research quality is diverse, uncertain, and 
multidimensional. It is highly questionable that there exists one, true indicator of research quality, which captures 
the efforts of scientists within all research communities to the same extent. In some communities, for example, only 
empirical research constitutes good research, while in other communities a novel research question or a original 
theory is much more important. For this reason, indicators capturing research quality are not only multidimensional, 
but also highly dependent on the specific research community. 
Public management should return to approved methods, such as engaging independent experts who in turn 
provide measurements of research quality for their research communities. Experts have the insights that are needed 
to assess primary research data within their communities. This knowledge helps them to develop indicators, which 
measure the past and prospective future performance of individual scholars or of a group of scholars.With the help 
of these experts, evaluators can construct indicators measuring the research quality within a community. In order to 
compare the research quality of scientists or groups of different communities, evaluators can normalize “quality 
scores.” 
Relying on independent community experts also has some disadvantages. First, it may isolate the different 
research communities within a field. Second, the main characteristics of research—academic freedom and 
uncertainty (Dasgupta and David 1994; Merton 1973; Osterloh and Frey 2009; Polanyi 1962)—are only captured to 
a small extent. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that no research evaluation is perfect and that every 
research evaluation has significant consequences for the scientific community. For both reasons, we recommend that 
evaluations be undertaken only for restricted tasks, for instance, for promotion decisions or as part of an external 
monitoring of universities and research institutions. External monitoring should not take place as often as every 
year. An interval of five or ten years seems sufficient because the research quality of an entire institution does not 
change quickly. Further, because science depends on history, new evaluations should not rely on former 
classifications of research communities or former measurements of research quality. Instead, evaluations have to 
start by identifying research communities and by elaborating indicators measuring research quality in cooperation 
with experts of the respective research communities. 
 
Appendix 
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A. Journal impact calculated in different rankings 
 
<insert table A1> 
 
B. Comparisons of different definitions of board membership 
 
Table A2 compares the rankings of scholars, institutions, and countries according to the definitions of board 
membership. We document (a) the Pearson correlation for the absolute number of memberships on editorial boards 
calculated with different definitions (? Board Membership) and (b) the Spearman-Rho correlation for the rankings 
calculated with different definitions (Combined Quality Ranking).  
 
<insert Table A2> 
 
The results in Table A2 show that rankings calculated with different definitions of board membership are highly 
correlated with rankings calculated with the broad definition of board membership. The smallest Spearman-Rho 
correlation amounts to 0.87** and the highest is 0.99**. The number of board positions calculated with different 
definitions has a high correlation with the number of positions calculated with the broad definition. The smallest 
Pearson correlation amounts to 0.87** and the highest is 1.00**. Thus, the definition of board membership does not 
bias the rankings of scholars, universities, or countries. For simplicity, we only consider the broad definition of 
board membership.  
 
C. Rankings of individual scholars based on different quantitative measures 
 
Figure A1 compares the ranking of a scholar in the ISI citation ranking with his or her ranking in the IDEAS citation 
ranking. The figure shows that the overlap between the two citation rankings is small. Most scholars are listed in one 
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but not in both rankings. Many scholars listed in the ISI ranking at the top are listed in the IDEAS ranking at the 
bottom.  
 
<insert Figure A1> 
 
Comparing the ranking of a scholar in the ISI citation ranking with his or her ranking in the IDEAS paper 
ranking, the same general picture emerges. Again, scholars listed in the ISI citation ranking at the top are listed in 
the IDEAS paper ranking at the bottom. 
When one compares the ranking of a scholar in the IDEAS citation ranking with his or her ranking in the IDEAS 
paper ranking, the ranking of individual scholars depends to a large extent on the ranking method used, and is far 
from an objective evaluation. 
As to the ranking of a university according to ISI citations with the ranking of a university in the Shanghai study, 
the overlap between the two quantity rankings is not larger than the overlap between the quality and quantity 
rankings: More than half of all institutions are only considered in one ranking but not in both rankings. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Quality Rankings 1 (? Board Membership) and 2 (? Significance) 
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Figure 2. Consistency of the Board Ranking with the ISI Citation Ranking 
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Table 1. Editorial boards according to individual scholars 
Name ? Board 
Membership 
Quality  
Ranking 1 
(range: 1-7) 
? Significance Quality  
Ranking 2 
(range: 1-382) 
Combined 
Quality Ranking  
(range: 1-389) 
Jonathan Temple 7 1 0.731 2 1 
Kenneth Arrow 7 1 0.138 28 2 
John List 6 2 0.133 31 3 
Reinhard Selten 6 2 0.114 42 4 
David Sappington 5 3 0.167 12 5 
Edward Glaeser 5 3 0.154 18 6 
Jacques-François 
Thisse 5 
3 
0.146 23 7 
Debraj Ray 5 3 0.136 30 8 
Han Bleichrodt 5 3 0.125 34 9 
Jacob Goeree 5 3 0.092 87 10 
Vernon L. Smith 5 3 0.090 98 11 
William Easterly 4 4 0.190 8 12 
Christopher Taber 4 4 0.162 14 13 
Mark Gertler 4 4 0.158 15 14 
Daron Acemoglu 4 4 0.157 16 15 
Francesco Caselli 4 4 0.153 19 16 
Janet Currie 4 4 0.148 21 17 
Dora Costa 4 4 0.146 22 18 
Henry Overman 4 4 0.140 26 19 
Hanming Fang 4 4 0.131 32 20 
Marc Rysman 4 4 0.125 36 21 
Frank Schorfheide 4 4 0.119 39 22 
Peter Robinson 4 4 0.118 41 23 
Andrew Atkeson 4 4 0.111 46 24 
Graham Elliott 4 4 0.108 48 25 
Daniel McMillen 4 4 0.108 49 26 
David Martimort 4 4 0.102 60 27 
Raghuram Rajan 4 4 0.099 66 28 
Burton Hollifield 4 4 0.098 68 29 
Aviv Nevo 4 4 0.097 72 30 
Jason Shogren 4 4 0.095 78 31 
Andrew Metrick 4 4 0.092 90 32 
Steven Kou 4 4 0.090 100 33 
Mark Machina 4 4 0.089 105 34 
Hervé Moulin 4 4 0.077 136 35 
Steffen Huck 4 4 0.077 141 36 
William Thomson 4 4 0.070 164 37 
Teck-Hua Ho 4 4 0.069 168 38 
Rachel Croson 4 4 0.069 169 39 
Rakesh Vohra 4 4 0.064 193 40 
Scott Stern 4 4 0.055 234 41 
Ashish Arora 4 4 0.028 351 43 
Note: The table includes all persons with four or more board memberships (according to the broad definition). 
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Table 2.  Editorial boards according to universities 
Name ? Board 
Member- 
ship 
Quality 
Ranking 1  
(range:  
1-48) 
? 
Signifi-
cance 
Quality 
Ranking 2  
(range:  
1-398) 
Combined 
Quality  
Ranking  
(range:  
1-403) 
? per 
Faculty 
Member 
Quality 
Ranking 
3 
Harvard University 100 1 2.57 2 1 0.83 28 
Stanford University 98 2 2.30 4 2 1.07 10 
University of Pennsylvania 79 3 1.85 9 3 1.01 12 
Northwestern University 77 4 2.09 6 4 1.13 9 
London School of Econ. & 
Pol. Sci. 76 5 2.81 5 6 1.04 11 
MIT 76 5 2.16 1 5 1.17 8 
New York University 76 5 2.01 7 7 0.93 18 
University of Chicago 72 6 0.77 8 8 0.77 34 
University of California 
Berkeley 69 7 1.69 10 9 0.74 37 
Duke University 64 8 2.43 3 10 1.45 3 
Columbia University 64 8 1.50 12 11 0.75 35 
Carnegie Mellon University 56 9 1.02 21 12 1.37 4 
University of California LA 50 10 1.34 13 13 0.71 39 
Yale University 50 10 1.34 15 14 0.83 27 
Princeton University 49 11 1.53 11 15 0.94 17 
University of Michigan 49 11 1.11 20 16 0.74 36 
University of Wisconsin 47 12 1.34 14 17 0.89 23 
University of Washington 46 13 1.21 18 18 1.70 2 
Cornell University 44 14 1.17 19 19 0.67 48 
University of Texas 39 15 0.74 33 20 0.91 20 
Note: The table shows the first 20 universities according to the number of board positions (according to the broad 
definition). 
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Table 3. Editorial boards according to countries 
Name ? Board 
Membership 
Quality 
Ranking 1 
(range:  
1-29) 
? 
Significance 
Quality 
Ranking 2 
(range:  
1-37) 
Combined 
Quality  
Ranking  
(range: 1-50) 
? per 
1 million 
inhabitants 
Quality 
Ranking 3 
(range:  
1-50) 
USA 2421 1 61.75 1 1 8.04 1 
UK 480 2 16.62 2 2 7.90 2 
Canada 159 3 4.35 3 3 4.76 7 
France 145 4 3.80 4 4 2.28 18 
Germany 118 5 3.32 5 5 1.43 21 
Netherlands 94 6 2.42 7 7 5.67 5 
Australia 86 7 2.78 6 6 4.21 13 
Japan 55 8 1.55 8 8 0.43 29 
Italy 49 9 1.18 11 11 0.84 25 
Israel 44 10 1.13 12 12 7.00 3 
Spain 45 11 1.12 10 10 1.04 22 
Belgium 42 12 1.26 13 13 4.23 12 
Sweden 40 13 1.39 9 9 4.43 9 
Switzerland 33 14 0.98 14 14 4.37 11 
Austria 27 15 0.69 18 18 3.29 16 
Finland 23 16 0.78 17 17 4.39 10 
Denmark 23 16 0.79 16 16 4.21 14 
Norway 22 17 0.89 15 15 4.75 8 
China 21 18 0.57 19 19 0.02 47 
India 21 18 0.45 20 20 0.02 48 
Note: The table documents the first 20 countries according to the number of board positions (according to the broad 
definition). 
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Figure A1. Individual scholars: consistency of the ISI and IDEAS Citation Rankings 
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Table A1. Journal impact calculated in different rankings 
Journal title Impact 
Factor 
2006 
Handels-
blatt 2007 
Combes/
Linnemer 
2003 
Tinbergen 
Institute 
2007 
IfW07 VIS 2008 
Accounting R. >2.0 0.40 0.33 A - - 
American Economic R. >1.5 1.00 1.00 AA AA AA 
American J. of Agricultural Economics >1.0 0.40 0.50 B C C 
Annals of Statistics - 0.67 - - - - 
Applied Economics >0.5 0.30 0.33 B C C 
Australien J. of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics  
>0.5 - - - - - 
BE "Advances" J.s - 0.30 - - B B 
BE "Frontiers" J. - 0.50 - - A A 
Bell J. of Economics >1.0 0.67 - A (A) (A) 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity >1.5 0.40 0.33 - A A 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studie >1.0 - - - - - 
Cambridge J. of Economics >0.5 0.30 0.33 B - - 
Canadian J. of Economics - 0.40 0.50 B B B 
Computational Statistics and Data Analysis - 0.30 - - - - 
Ecological Economics  >1.0 0.20 0.17 B C C 
Econometric Theory >0.5 0.67 0.67 A B B 
Econometrica >2.0 1.00 1.00 AA AA AA 
Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 
>0.5 0.20 0.17 B C C 
Economic Geography >1.5 0.30 0.33 B C C 
Economic History R. >0.5 0.30 0.33 B - - 
Economic Inquiry >0.0 0.30 0.33 B B B 
Economic J. >1.5 0.50 0.50 A A A 
Economic Policy >1.0 0.30 0.33 B B B 
Economic Theory >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
Economica >0.0 0.30 0.33 B C C 
Economics and Philosophy >0.0 0.30 0.33 B - - 
Economics Letters >0.0 0.40 0.50 B C C 
Economics of Transition >1.0 0.30 0.33 - B B 
Economy and Society >1.5 - - - - - 
Energy Economics >1.0 0.30 0.33 B C C 
Energy J. >1.0 0.20 0.17 - B B 
Environment and Planning A >1.5 0.30 0.33 B - - 
Eurasian Geography and Economics >1.5 - - - - - 
European Economic R. >1.0 0.67 0.67 A A A 
Experimental Economics >1.0 0.20 0.33 - - - 
Explorations in Economic History >0.5 0.40 0.50 B - - 
Finance and Stochastics >1.5 0.30 - - - - 
Food Policy >0.5 - - - - - 
Games and Economic Behavior >0.5 0.67 0.67 A - - 
Health Economics >2.0 0.20 0.17 B C C 
History of Political Economy - 0.30 0.33 B - - 
Industrial and Corporate Change >1.0 - - - - - 
Industrial and Labour Relations R. - 0.40 0.50 B B B 
International Economic R. >1.0 0.67 0.67 A A A 
International J. of Forecasting >1.0 0.20 0.17 B - - 
International J. of Game Theory >0.0 0.40 0.50 B - - 
International J. of Industrial Organization >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
International Statistical R. - 0.30 - - - - 
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J of the Royal Statistical Society - Series A - 0.50 0.33 - - - 
J of the Royal Statistical Society - Series B - 0.67 - - - - 
J. of Accounting and Economics >3.0 0.30 0.17 A - - 
J. of Applied Econometrics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
J. of Banking and Finance >0.5 0.30 0.33 B C C 
J. of Business >0.5 0.30 0.50 - - - 
J. of Business and Economic Statistics >1.0 0.67 0.67 A A A 
J. of Comparative Economics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
J. of Computational and Graphical 
Statistics 
- 0.30 - - - - 
J. of Development Economics >1.0 0.40 0.50 B B B 
J. of Development Studies >0.5 0.30 0.33 - B B 
J. of Econometrics >1.5 0.67 0.67 A A A 
J. of Economic Behavior and Organization >0.5 0.40 0.50 B C C 
J. of Economic Dynamics and Control >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
J. of Economic Geography >2.5 0.10 - - C C 
J. of Economic Growth >3.0 0.40 0.33 B A A 
J. of Economic History >0.0 0.40 0.50 B - - 
J. of Economic Literature >4.5 0.50 0.50 A A A 
J. of Economic Perspectives >2.5 0.50 0.50 A A A 
J. of Economic Theory >1.0 0.67 0.67 A B B 
J. of Economics and Management >1.0 - - - - - 
J. of Economics and Management 
Strategy 
>1.0 0.40 0.50 B - - 
J. of Environ. Economics and Management >1.0 0.50 0.50 A B B 
J. of Finance >3.0 0.67 0.67 AA A A 
J. of Financial and Quantitative Analysis >1.0 0.40 0.50 B - - 
J. of Financial Economics >2.0 0.50 0.50 A A A 
J. of Financial Intermediation >1.0 0.40 0.33 A - - 
J. of Health Economics >2.0 0.50 0.50 A B B 
J. of Human Resources >1.0 0.50 0.50 A A A 
J. of Industrial Economics >1.0 0.40 0.50 B B B 
J. of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 
- 0.30 0.33 B C C 
J. of International Economics >1.5 0.67 0.67 A A A 
J. of International Money and Finance >0.5 0.30 0.33 B B B 
J. of Labor Economics >1.5 0.67 0.67 A A A 
J. of Law and Economics >1.0 0.40 0.50 B B B 
J. of Law, Economics and Organization >1.5 0.50 0.50 A C C 
J. of Macroeconomics >0.0 0.40 0.50 B C C 
J. of Marketing Research >2.0 0.50 - A - - 
J. of Mathematical Economics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B C C 
J. of Monetary Economics >1.0 0.67 0.67 A A A 
J. of Money, Credit and Banking >1.0 0.67 0.67 A A A 
J. of Multivariate Analysis - 0.30 - - - - 
J. of Political Economy >3.0 1.00 1.00 AA AA AA 
J. of Population Economics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B C C 
J. of Public Economics >1.0 0.67 0.67 A B B 
J. of Regional Science >1.0 0.30 0.33 B C C 
J. of Regulatory Economics >0.5 0.30 0.33 - B B 
J. of Risk and Uncertainty >0.5 0.50 0.50 A - - 
J. of the American Statistical Association - 0.67 0.67 - - - 
J. of the European Economic Association - 0.67 - A A A 
J. of Time Series Analysis - 0.30 - - - - 
J. of Transport Economics and Policy >1.0 0.20 - B C C 
J. of Urban Economics >1.0 0.50 0.50 A B B 
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Kyklos >0.5 0.30 0.33 B C C 
Labour Economics >0.5 0.30 0.33 B B B 
Land Economics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
Management Science >1.5 0.50 - A - - 
Marketing Science >3.5 0.40 0.33 A - - 
Mathematical Finance >1.0 0.20 0.17 B - - 
Mathematics of Operations Research - 0.50 - A - - 
National Tax J. >0.5 0.30 0.33 B - - 
Operations Research - 0.50 - A - - 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics >0.5 0.30 0.33 B B B 
Oxford Economic Papers >1.0 0.30 0.33 B B B 
Public Choice >0.0 0.40 0.50 B C C 
Quantitative Finance >0.5 - - - - - 
Quarterly J. of Economics >3.5 1.00 1.00 AA AA AA 
R. of Economic Studies >2.0 1.00 1.00 AA AA AA 
R. of Economics and Statistics >1.5 0.67 0.67 A A A 
R. of Financial Studies >1.5 0.50 0.50 A - - 
R. of International Political Economy  >0.5 - - - - - 
Regional Science and Urban Economics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
Resource and Energy Economics >1.0 0.20 0.17 B C C 
Scandinavian J. of Economics >0.5 0.40 0.50 B B B 
Scandinavian J. of Statistics - 0.30 - - - - 
Social Choice and Welfare >0.0 0.40 0.50 B - - 
Southern Economic J. >0.0 0.30 0.33 B B B 
Statistical Science - 0.50 - - - - 
Statistics and Computing - 0.50 - - - - 
Theory and Decision >0.0 0.40 0.50 B - - 
Work Employment and Society >0.5 - - - - - 
World Bank Economic R. >1.0 0.40 0.33 A B B 
World Bank Research Observer >2.5 0.20 0.17 - B B 
World Development >1.0 0.30 0.33 B B B 
World Economy >0.5 0.30 0.33 B C C 
Note: legend J. = Journal, R. = Review.  
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Table A2.  Sensitivity analysis of different definitions of board membership 
Broad definition Editor definition Narrow definition Broad definition with 
home and affiliation 
journals 
(N=4209 positions) (N=4568 positions) (N=3836 positions) (N=4447 positions) 
Scientist Rankings     
(N=3515 individuals)  (N=3783 individuals)  (N=3276 individuals) (N=3691 individuals) 
? Board Membership1 .87** .97** .95** 
Combined Quality Ranking 
2
 .89** .97** .87** 
University Rankings     
(N=754 institutions) (N=754 institutions) (N=754 institutions) (N=754 institutions) 
? Board Membership1 .99** .99** .99** 
Combined Quality Ranking 
2
 .94** .92** .96** 
Country Rankings     
(N=50 countries) (N=50 countries) (N=50 countries) (N=50 countries) 
? Board Membership1 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
Combined Quality Ranking 
2
 .98** .99** .95** 
 
Notes:
 1
 Pearson Correlation; 
 2 
Spearman-Rho Correlation; ** sig. 0.01%. The broad definition includes coeditor and 
board member positions; the editor definition includes editors, coeditors, and board members; the narrow definition 
includes only board member positions; the broad definition with home and association journals also includes home and 
association journals. Ranks were specified using the absolute number of membership on editorial boards as a first 
sorting criterion (? Board Membership) and the significance of board positions as a second sorting criterion (? 
Significance). “Significance” is the sum of board positions, whereas each board position is divided by the number of 
similar positions offered by a journal. 
 
